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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to contribute to comparative research towards a
theory of modem genocide and ways to prevent mass murder. Definitions, typologies,
key elements, patterns, a comparison of the Holocaust with the Rwandan genocide, and
preventive measures are included in the study.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Mass violence has riddled the twentieth century. The genocide in Rwanda marks
the most extreme case. Violent conflict is not going on between East and West, or
between North and South, but is being suffered in this very moment inside more than
fifty states. The regional distribution of contemporary mass violence shows a clear
global trend: violent conflict is infrequent in the North and West but part of normality in
the South and some areas of the East. Much of the violence in the South would not have
occurred and acts of genocide would not have been committed without involvement of
the North. Northern complicity with state crimes in the South has not at all been an
exception.
Since 1945 there have been more than 250 violent conflicts occurring worldwide
- until the late 1980s nearly exclusively in the Third World. Assertions of new states
regarding their own citizen and substate collectivities were put forth in an increasingly
aggressive way. The victims were mainly among minority nationalities, nondominant
ethnic groups, and indigenous peoples. Ethnicity and ethnic violence became the single
most dangerous source for violence. It produced new types of non-Clausewitzean
warfare and modern genocide in the world. In two out of three cases of mass violence we
find an ethnic component. That means the ethnic factor (ethnicity) is a dominant or
influential component.
High frequency and huge potential of forgotten wars and forgotten massacres
became decisive regarding the lack of possibilities for structural prevention of violence,
conflict management and transformation, as well as regarding the role of multilateralism
in preventing mass violence. The first question "What to do in a particular situation?" is
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linked to the particular type of conflict we are dealing with. The second question "When
to do what?" underlines the importance of timing in response to conflict.
Today gross human rights violations, genocidal atrocities, and in some cases
outright genocide cause havoc in many regions of the world and result in whole
populations being petrified in fear and mass traumatization. Violence not only kills
humans but also kills life chances for those surviving. Today mass violence is
intrinsically linked with ethnicization from above and the contemporary wave of ethnic
nationalism from below. Unlike most new types of warfare, genocide is always a state
organized crime. If attempts to prevent mass violence and genocide are to be successful
then the quest of understanding has to concentrate on the following interlinked areas.
First, the secrets of ethnicity and the process of ethnicization have to be
uncovered. We are dealing with a powerful source of deep-rooted conflict, often
nourished by destructive interaction in the past. 1 If ethnicity is combined with
domination then things become dangerous. Ethnicity becomes a resource for political
manipulation and vested interests.
Second, the phenomenon of weak or failed states became more salient in the
1990s. Awareness is growing that failed states are the most dangerous states. The well
being, security, and sometimes the very survival of nondominant groups are put at the
disposition of states. Failed states threaten to become genocidal states.
Third, meaningful prevention of violent conflict has a very strong structural
component. Such structural prevention aims at safeguarding inter-ethnic balance and an

1

Charles Tajfel, "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination," Science 223 (11): 96-102.
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accommodation of just demands on a sustainable base, providing protection and space for
nondominant and vulnerable groups.
Fourth, the timing of conflict management is crucial. If conflicts break out
violently then it is already too late for most peaceful solutions. Successful prevention of
violent conflict cannot be reactive, as a response to crisis and violent conflict, but has to
be anticipatory.
Fifth, the best prevention is preclusive promotion and institutionalization of
constructive relationships between different groups. 2 Often the combination of different
methods such as minority protection, power sharing, internal self-determination, e.g. self
governance and forms of autonomy, is successful. 3 There is no simple cure-all.
Several publications including Samantha Power's book, quest for an explanation
of how and why US governments steer clear of genocidal violence. 4 Her book raises the
question to a wide spectrum of respondents, but, in the end, fails to find an all
encompassing answer. She is forced to remain content with the theory of avoiding a
quagmire. I found her book and others very informative but sensed that the authors got
lost in the wealth of information and came out short on analysis.
The problem is that today there are only a few research projects operating on a
larger scale with the attempt to relate the development of theoretical findings with
empirical studies and vice-versa; not talking about the step beyond into practical action of

2 Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973).
Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,
edited by Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990) pp. 451-476.
4
Samantha Power, "A Problemfrom Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (New York, NY: Basic
Books, 2002).
3
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early warning and genocide prevention and peace building. This thesis seeks to fill that
gap.
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Chapter 2: Defining Genocide and Mass Murder
The worst kind of destructive interaction of different ethnic or national groups
(one of them in possession of the state) is mass murder and genocide. 5 Genocide is the
most barbaric crime and has long-term effects. Cold-blooded state-organized mass
murder is not an exceptional crime. The death toll of wars in this century is equaled by
the death toll of genocide.6 Genocide is the most severe type of violent conflict; its
victims are civilians including old people, children, and even babies. Article III of the
Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines the crime
as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 7
One of the most important observations is that genocide and colonization were
always closely linked. The largest ever genocide in modem history was committed by
half a dozen European states in what was later called the Third World. Large-scale
genocide was committed against American Indians, Africans and Afro-Americans, and
subjugated people in European colonies.

5 Julian Burger, Report from the Frontier: The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed
Books, 1987) pp. 83-84. Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Brookfield, VT:
Dartmouth, 1995) pp.11-12.
6
Ibid..
7
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty
Series, 78: 277. The convention was adopted by UN General Assembly (Resolution 260 (III) A) on 9 Dec.
1948.
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European colonial expansion and genocide since 1500
According to Darcy Ribeiro the Indians of the Americas were reduced by the
Spaniards in the South and European settlers in the North from 80 million in 1492 to 3.5
million 1750.8 Genocide against Indians has continued until today, e.g. in Paraguay,
Guatemala, and Brazil. From 1500 onwards Africa lost one hundred million people to
European slavery. Most enslaved Africans died under terrible conditions during mass
transport from Africa to Americas. Genocide against Africans was continued by
infamous lynching campaigns in the southern US. 9
It is important to understand that genocide was an inherent part of general practice
employed by virtually all European powers throughout the colonial period, with Germany
and Britain ranking second to Spain. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
the German colonial genocide against the Herera and Nama in German Southwest Africa
and the diverse people of Southern Tanganyika constituted preparatory stages for modem
genocide. 10
Definitions and cases
Genocide is a phenomenon known since ancient times; it means actions carried
out by a state or ruler with the intent to systematically kill a particular community of
people or social collectivity, resulting in destroying the targeted group in whole or in part.
Modern genocide is state-organized mass murder and crimes against humanity
characterized by the intention of the rulers to exterminate individuals because of
8

Darcy Ribeiro, The Americas and Civilization (New York: Dutton, 1971) p. 356.
Roger Smith, "Exploring the United States' Thirty-Five-Year Reluctance to Ratify the Genocide
Convention," Harvard Human Rights Journal 5 (Spring): pp. 227-233.
10
John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) p.
172.
9
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belonging to a particular national, ethnic, religious, or racial group. Victims belonging to
a particular cultural group (ethnocide), to a particular political group (politicide) or to a
particular social group (democide) are not equally well protected by the UN Anti
Genocide Convention of 1948. 1 1 Genocide is a premeditated mass crime that has been
systematically planned, prepared, and executed.
Massacres are genocidal acts committed by different types of perpetrators such as
state agents or entire agencies, political extremists and interest groups against vulnerable
groups, which have been excluded from mainstream society. Total genocide means that
the perpetrators aimed at the complete extermination and destruction in whole of a
particular community or group of people, with the intent to destroy its reproduction (as a
group) as well as its culture and institutions.
Typology of genocide
The distinction of scale must be introduced. The wording of the Anti-Genocide
Convention of 1948 suggests genocide in whole and genocide in part, thus total or full
scale genocide and partial or large-scale genocide. Robert Melson combined this
distinction of scale (total/partial) with the equally obvious distinction of place (domestic/
foreign). 12
This also calls in the type of victims targeted. Modem full-scale genocide in this
century, such as the ones committed by the Young Turks, the Nazis and their allies, the
Khmer Rouge, and the Hutu power regime in Rwanda, were all directed against a

11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations
Treaty Series, 78: 277.
12
Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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domestic component of the respective societies or against several components at once. In
all four cases the state machinery was used extensively.
The type of perpetrator, being state and non-state actors would therefore define an
obvious distinction and third dimension of the crime of genocide. In order to broaden the
picture I include other types of mass murder, such as massacres, to be distinguished from
total genocide. It becomes more illustrative with reference to structural situations in
which I will explain below. In Table 1 this typology of genocide is illustrated with a
series of cases.
The extreme worst case of genocide is when the perpetrators are domestic/state
actors. This results in the total extermination of a minority, planned and executed by the
state. Carried out by the same perpetrators, mass murder would include massacres
against a minority organized by state agents/agencies.
Next domestic/non-state actors resulting in full-scale genocide include European
adventurers and invaders against indigenous groups in settler colonies of the Americas
and Australia. Mass murder or massacres include genocidal atrocities directed against a
minority committed by extremists/interest groups.
Full-scale genocide occurs under foreign/state actors with colonial genocides
committed by European powers against indigenous people (mainly Spain, Britain,
Portugal, and Germany). The same actors result in mass murder when committed by
invaders against civilian populations and rebellious or resisting groups.
Finally, there is no evidence found of a full-scale genocide when foreign/non-state
actors are the perpetrators but mass murder results when acts are committed by invading
settlers against local populations and resisting groups.
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Table 1: Typology of Genocide: Cases in the 10-Types Outline
20th century
genocide and
mass murder
domestic/ state
actors

full-scale genocide

mass murder
. (massacres)

·•

.- :·.:- :

th

>

·.

19 century internal colonial
genocide of the USA against the
Indians extending into 20th
century; large-scale genocides
during WWI & WWII; Germans in
FSU, Balkans & Greece; Serbs vs.
Albanians 1912; Jews 19402

Hundreds of cases
worst mass murder: Stalin's massacres
against Caucasians 1943-57, the Gulags,
mass murder in Ukraine, etc.; massacres
of USA against Indians

four cases of total full-scale
genocide in this century: Aghet,
Shoah, Pol Pot's Cambodia 197579, Rwanda 1994
large scale genocide cases: Hima
Tutsi army in Burundi ( 1972) vs.
Hutu elites & Tutsi-Banyaruguru
opposition; military regimes vs.
Guatemala's indigenous Mayan
majority 1980s

since 1945 ( Gurr & Harff compiled 44
large cases); Burma's military vs.
minorities since 1948; Burma vs.
students in 1988; pogroms against
Palestinians since 1948, later in Shatila /
Sabra near Beirut; pogroms against
Chinese and mass murder of alleged
communists in Indonesia; Apartheid
crimes in South Africa; several hundred
other cases, e.g. China's Tiananmen
massacre

domestic/
non-state
perpetrators

by European settlers vs.
Amerindians; landless peasants vs.
low land Indian peoples in the
Amazon

several hundred cases; worst pogroms
against Jews and Roma in several states
of Eastern and Western Europe; lynching
of Blacks in USA

foreign
genocide/ state
actors

colonial genocide of the Germans
vs. Herero and Nama

USA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by
indiscriminate bombing, killing and
spraying of civilians in the 1970s; USSR
dirty war against Afghani civilians

foreign
genocide/ non
state actors

no case

Mercenaries in Third world conflicts;
TNCs against marginal groups

(before 1945)

domestic/ state
actors
(after 1945)
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Who is who: Perpetrators and victims
There is some agreement in the question of defining the victim group largely
following Raphael Lemkin's definition of genocide and the wording of the Anti
Genocide Convention of 1948. 1 3 However, the convention would partly go further than
the present minimal consensus, especially concerning the gray area of indirect genocidal
practices and measures.
Particular national, ethnic, or political groups rule a state in crisis, often as
ethnocracy. Such dominant groups, no matter if they are demographically in a majority
or minority position, were under particular historic circumstances able to bring the new
state into their own, often as a consequence of colonial legacies, wars or crisis. Dominant
groups got into position of command over the so-called monopoly of violence; they
exercise firm control (total state). Assertive relationships towards minority groups, the
political opposition, religious communities, and ethnically distinct nationalities (nations
without own state) became a dangerous source of violent conflict long ago in the South
and increasingly so with each cycle of decolonization since 1 945. Exclusion of
minorities and their persecution by dominant groups commanding the states' monopolies
of violence became the most dangerous source of destructive violence in modem times.
In situations of exclusion there is a risk of genocide.

13 "Genocide means ... acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group as such" (Article 2). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Article 2, United Nations Treaty Series, 78: 277. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe; Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944).
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Four cases of full-scale genocide in the twentieth century
Full-scale total genocide means that the perpetrators were aiming at the total
destruction of a particular community of peoples (genocide in whole, not in part) and the
result varied accordingly. There were only very few cases of total genocide before the
twentieth century, namely the largest ever genocide committed 1492- 1750 by the Iberians
against the American Indians and the genocide against North American Indians by
European powers and settlers. 14 In the twentieth century alone there were four cases of
full-scale genocide, causing more victims than in any previous period.
1 . the Aghet: Turkish genocide 1914-23 against the Armenians 15
2. the Holocaust: genocides committed 1933-45 by the fascist German state and its allies
against the European Jews, Roma, Russians, other Slavic peoples, POWs, slave
workers, and the political opposition 1 6
3. the Khmer Rouge genocide in Kampuchea 1975-79 against the Vietnamese, Cham
Muslim and Chinese minorities as well as against the Khmer urban classes 1 7
4. the Hutu-power genocide in Rwanda 1994 committed by the akazu elite, their state
machinery, Hutu-power factions of all political parties and a huge number of common
people against the Tutsi branch of the Banyarwanda and against Hutu opponents. 1 8
The most deadly regimes in the twentieth century have all committed genocide
against domestic groups, mainly the barbarian attempt to exterminate specific minorities.

14

Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide, Ecocide, and
Colonization (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2002) pp. 53-55.
15
Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict (New Bunswick,

NJ: Transaction, 1999).
16
Doris. L. Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2003).
17
Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge,
1975-79 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
18
Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst, 1995).

12
Chapter 3: Genocide in the Twentieth Century

The most infamous cases of state organized crimes in modem Europe are large
scale genocide committed during both World Wars. The executioners of the Holocaust
were not only Germans but also local collaborators among different nations in occupied
countries all over Europe; the executioners of the Armenian genocide were also recruited
among non-Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire. 1 9 Both large-scale genocides were
committed under the cover of warfare. However, the genocidal agenda of the
perpetrators was known, e.g. in the case of German fascism openly announced by Hitler
well in advance.
War as a smoke screen for slaughter
War provided a smoke screen for the slaughter of millions of civilian victims.
After reaching the height of power in the declining empire in 19 14, the Young Turk
military elite began with systematic preparations for the genocide against the Armenians.
On August 2, 19 14, a secret German-Turkish agreement on the entry of Turkey at the
side of Germany into World War I was signed. 20 The situation was similar concerning
the fascist genocides. Since 1 939 Germany was in war with its neighbors, starting with
Poland where in the following years alone 4.4 million civilians perished. Genocide was
one of the means totalitarian regimes in Europe used against national, ethnic, or religious
minorities, which played leading roles in the economy and culture of their respective
countries.21
19

Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust.
Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict, p. 1 29.
21
Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish genocide ( 1 9 1 5) and the German
Holocaust (1939- 1 945)," Comparative Studies in Sociology, 1 ( 1 978); Robert Melson, Revolution and
Genocide: On the Origins ofArmenian Genocide and the Holocaust.

20
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The Holocaust as model genocide: Totalitarism and superior race in Germany
Genocidal atrocities started with politicide. Violence was first directed against
communists, trade unionists, and socialists. Mass executions and slaughter by special
task forces such as the SA and later the SS, as the main instrument of fascist terror policy
under the command of the Fuhrer, the Nazi power elite and the establishment of the
National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). 22 When World War II was started
with Hitler's Blitzkrieg against Poland, mass executions began in 1939. Following the
occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe, mass murder against the European Jews,
Roma, Russians, and other people was ordered immediately and took the form of full
scale genocide. Units of the German army and special battalions executed the mass
murder. The infamous Einsatzgruppen A-D partly consisted of police reserve battalions
of normal Germans. 23 Finally the civilian population and prisoners of war from the
USSR were targeted. 24 The overkill of prisoners and millions of slave workers through
hard labor and inhumane conditions in the concentration camps was organized similar to
the killings in war zones. The Nazi terror reign was culminating in industrial genocide in
places like Auschwitz, Dachau, and in other extermination factories, especially
constructed for the execution of the Final Solution, by cremating millions, separated in
different categories of victim, throughout the years 1942-1945. 25
More than eighteen million people became victims of the Nazi genocide and the
total war fascist Germany brought over Eastern Europe; this excludes the victims in

Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (Westview Press, 2002) pp. 139-140.
Ibid., p. 138.
24
Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust.
25
Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, pp. 102-108.
22

23
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southeastern Europe and Northern Africa. 26 German fascism murdered six million Jews,
3.3 million Soviet POWs, two million Romani, almost one million Serbs, and millions of
others.27 The indirect death toll among the civilian populations (democide) was
enormous. Seven million people died of hunger during the German extermination war in
the hinterlands of the former Soviet Union only. 28 These were cases of intentional mass
murder. In both cases (Germany 1940s and Turkey 19 10s) the exterminatory ideologies
used were an inherent part of premodem ethnist or racist theories.
Modem genocide in the South: Ongoing legacies of colonialism
Examples of fifty years of modem post-colonial genocide, 1948 to 1998, are
manifold. 29 Legacies of colonialism led to genocide or genocidal atrocities in different
parts of the world since the Second World War. Other destructive forms of interaction
between states and nations/nationalities are to be considered. Destructive interaction took
the form of forced assimilation of non-dominant groups; territorial invasion of minority
areas by state actors; settlement policy in indigenous territories, infiltration of homelands
of minorities or indigenous groups; forced massive transfer of populations, forced
resettlement, ethnic cleansing, expulsion, and deportation. 30

In

many cases genocide was

Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust.
John G. Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned
Citizen (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001) p. 6.
28
Ibid..
29
Burma since 1948, Southern and Central Sudan since 1960, Rwanda since 1959 and Burundi since 1964,
Timor from 1974, Pol Pot' s Cambodia in the 1970s, Burundi' s selective genocide in 1972, Genocide
against American Indians: continued in the 1970s against the Ache in Paraguay, in the 1980s against
Guatemala' s indigenous Mayan majority, in the 1990s against the Yanomami and other low land Indian
people in the Brazilian Amazon region, Burundi' s second partial genocide in 1993, in Congo-Zaire since
the 1970s, Rwanda 1994.
30
Examples for massive population transfer: Soviet Union in the Baltic states since 1945, China in Tibet
and Eastern Turkestan since the 1950s, Indonesia with its policy of transmigration in West Papua,
Moluccas, and Aceh, Bangla Desh in the Chittagong Hill Tracts since 1979, Ethiopia under Mengistu in
Oromia, in Gambella lowlands and the inter lake area (until 1990), Iraq and Iran in Kurdestan.
26
27
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committed in a situation of crisis, internal turmoil, or civil war, as for instance in Burma,
Indochina, Sudan, and Central Africa. 3 1 The Rwandan genocide is only the most extreme
case. Defenselessness of the victims or lack of formal power, as witnessed in Rwanda,
has been analyzed as contributing to the likelihood of genocide. 32 The Hutu extremists
killed an estimated 900,000 to 1.2 million. This represents three times more victims then
in all violent conflicts of the 1990s in the former USSR and in Yugoslavia together.

31

Frank Chalk and Kurt Johassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
32
Helen Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," Current Sociology 38, 1 ( 1990).
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Chapter 4: Patterns of Total Genocide

The elaboration of a comprehensive typology of genocides, based on the
definition of clear-cut criteria, is a demanding task. Identification of key elements of
comparison and of general patterns of genocides may help to reduce the voids of
comparative genocide research. This would contribute to the key objective of such
research, the prevention of future genocide and mass violence. Barbara Harff and Robert
Melson have both identified a number of common patterns of modern genocides. 33
Melson saw "four tidal waves of ethno-national conflict and genocide in the wake of
crushing or crumbling states and empires".34
The progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire produced the first of the
four total domestic genocides in this century, the Aghet, the destruction of the Armenia�s
in Anatolia by the regime of the Young Turks. The collapse of the German and Austro
Hungarian empires in WWI produced instability and the growth of fascism in Germany
since the 1920. _Under the cover of WWII_ the Nazis and their willing local supporters
committed large-scale genocide at home and in the occupied countries. By 1945 this had
resulted in the intended total extermination of the European Jews and the Roma. Partial
genocide was committed against a large number of Slavic people. Large-scale genocide
was committed against millions of slave workers and POWs.35
The decolonization period consisted of artificial and weak states searching for
ways of nation building, which was often violently directed against minorities and the
33

Barbara Harff, "The Ethiology of Genocides," in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski,
Genocide in the Modem Age: Ethiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (New York: Greenwood Press
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political opposition. Endless ethnic civil wars, liberation wars, secessions, and slaughter
of populations began soon after WWII in the Africa-Asian space. In Former British India
the separation of India and Pakistan ended in large-scale communal violence and horrible
bloodshed. Internal wars in Burma since 1948, the secession of Eastern Pakistan, and the
civil war in Sri Lanka crippled South Asia, followed by mass violence in Sudan, Algeria,
Indochina, Nigeria/Biafra, Indonesia, Uganda, Rwanda-Burundi, Former Portuguese
Africa, and the Hom of Africa. 36
The collapse of the federations of the USSR and Yugoslavia led to comparatively
less violent wave of wars, ethnic cleansing, and communal violence. In this period falls
the last and most rapid genocide of this century in Rwanda 1994, which was partly a
result of the end of the Cold War. The Rwandan genocide resulted in more destruction in
terms of loss of human lives than the ongoing instability, crisis, and warfare in parts of
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Rwanda was the first genocide in modem
history characterized by a massive participation of common people.
Common elements and patterns of genocidal processes
Analyzing and comparing the four total modem genocides of the twentieth
century produces a set of common elements and patterns of genocidal processes. Patterns
can be found by looking at the perpetrators and their environments. We identify and
explore
- the role of the elite, the core organizers, legitimizers and perpetrators of genocide, and
their relations to the mass of willing executioners,
- the internal and external conditions they find and create,
- the context in which they act,
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-

the political environment in which they take the decision to destroy,
the way genocidal extremists gain the state power and transform it,
the type of victims they chose,
the exterminatory ideology they use, and
the systematic way they plan, prepare and execute the crime of genocide.

Elites, perpetrators, objectives and the context of the crime
First we would look at the perpetrators, their ideology, the process of
victimization, and the way they executed the crime of genocide. An organized and
vicious elite is more likely to gain state power in situations of deep historic changes.
Under certain internal and external conditions they succeed in imposing their genocidal
and destructive aims. The agendas of such leaders are to destroy specific domestic
groups, which are as a rule always in a non-dominant and minority position. 37
Genocidal elites try to penetrate and dominate the state. Their objective is to
impose their aims on the state machinery they have conquered and on the majority people
of their respective societies. The modern nation state is the "predominant culprit in
genocides". 38 Evidently the likelihood to realize such aims is much higher in a
totalitarian system then in a democratic one. However, periods of imposed
democratization can be conductive to genocide, as the case of Rwanda exhibits in the
most drastic way.
The context is characterized by rapid political, social, and structural changes
which were described by the context of "national upheaval"39 , separatist conflict, internal
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strife, rebellion or "revolution"40• What is meant are rapid or abrupt historic changes
following an extended period of crisis. The aim of genocide is part of a larger project of
the nation-state (re)formation or its revision. This includes all the different processes of
changing regimes, moving of boundaries or loss of territory, warfare or security threats
resulting from (or perceived as) challenges to the dominant groups identity and to the
identity of the national political community.
Narrow nationalism, exterminatory ideology, and victimization
The redefinition or confusion of national identity by the power elites is a central
point. The perceived struggle for national survival, against internal and external enemies,
has to become somewhat plausible for the majority group. The foreign minorities will
function as scapegoats. The nation needs to be purified. The elimination of so-called
"foreign elements from within',4 1 is one of the common denominators of total modem
genocide. In reality all total domestic genocides were preceded not so much by real
challenges to national identity rather then by challenges to the dominant power strata,
having won, consolidated or maintained its power by use of force in an outright unstable
situation.
The intentions of the killers are expressed in their exterminatory ideology. This
ideology will always take up older stereotypes. The aim of the power elite is to single out
and exclude a group as the enemy of state and society. Extremist regimes are essentially
combining militarism, ethno-chauvinism, and ultra-nationalism with promises for their
population's bright future. They try to restore the allegedly threatened identity of their
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political constituency on a narrow hybrid base. The result is the ethnicization of the
nation. If any of its key elements came under heavy internal or external pressure for
change then the reaction was fierce and in the end self-destructive.
Support for genocide by a minority, and more important the indifference of the
majority, can ultimately be won if victimized groups are presented as racially, ethnically,
religiously, or morally different from the dominant group. Harff wrote of the "most
different groups" to become scapegoats for losses and "national frustrations" and the
targets of destruction.42 Most successful, this proved the construction of close links
between domestic enemies and external aggressors by the genocidal elites. Individual
victims may often not be easily identifiable, and there is usually a large gray area calling
for arbitrary solutions. As a result the target group becomes visible and easily
identifiable, as an imagined entity of domestic enemies seen as foreigners.
Extremist power-elites, willing executioners and lack of external constraints
Decisive elements are the exacerbation of existing internal cleavages, the lack of
external constraints in implementing so-called final solutions or/and foreign support for
it, and the control of the state by the power elites to allow for a genocidal state. Such a
state needs willing executioners. Of further importance is a subservient state bureaucracy
and obedient or extremist sections of armed forces or special troops. Conductive to the
genocidal aim are the great fear and confusion among the national population, the well
organized massive support by their core political constituencies, and the at least
lukewarm support among larger sections of grassroots. Describing the genocidal elites as
simply power-mad is not sufficient. There are structural reasons for their drive to state42
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centrism and extreme centralization of power, often symbolically in one person with a
single party platform. Obviously such a plan is bound to end in totalitarism and self
destruction. Often there is little or no external pressure to prevent the worst.
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Chapter 5: The State-Organized Genocide in Rwanda 1994: A Crime of Obedience
The genocide in Rwanda in 1 994 was a well-advertised and well-prepared attempt

to obliterate a minority. The whole state apparatus was mobilized for the purposes of
exterminating the Tutsi group. Over a period of months, public and private media called
upon loyal citizens to do their duty and dispatch their neighbors. The Catholic Church
and other churches (except the Muslims) failed disgracefully and, as institutions, kept up
a stubborn silence. 43 Donor countries were struck with blindness. Rationale for such
behavior includes the United States' thinning patience for peacekeeping. The Clinton
administration had taken office better disposed toward peacekeeping than any other
administration in US history. But Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN dues and
peacekeeping costs. It had tired of its obligation to foot one-third of the bill for what had
come to feel like an insatiable global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN
appetite for missions. The Clinton White House agreed that the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations needed fixing and insisted that the UN "learn to say no" to
chancy or costly missions. Rwanda was extremely low on the list of American priorities.
The media prepared the ground for the final solution, especially the radio stations.
The citizens were encouraged to hate the Tutsi and their accomplices. From April 6,
1 994 they were ordered to kill their fellow citizens.44 Mass participation in genocidal
atrocities involved a huge number of the male Hutu population. The genocide has to be
analyzed as a crime of obedience. Extermination was facilitated by a totalitarian
administrative system on five levels.
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The population played a direct, active, and massive part in a state ordered act of
genocide to which practically the whole minority of Tutsis who had remained in the
country fell victim.45 The genocide in Rwanda was an enormous crime of subordination
and submission to the murderous command of a state. Only half the population remained
in the country; the other half either fled or was murdered. The evacuation produced the
greatest and most ambivalent refugee crisis of modem times.
It will be many years before one can mention Rwanda without evoking the horror
of mutilated bodies and severed limbs floating down the Kagera River. Yet very few
Americans, even well informed ones, possess even the most rudimentary background
needed to understand what happened there. Even people who know a great deal about
Africa typically know very little about Rwanda; after all, dozens of countries crowd the
continent, and Rwanda has had relatively little political, economic, or cultural impact
beyond east-central Africa. The few Americans who knew anything at all about Rwanda
prior to the massacres knew it as one of the centers of Africa's uncontrollable AIDS
epidemic.
At first, a mass confusion surrounded the events of the spring of 1994, starting
with the apparent precipitating factor- the fatal downing of April 6 of a plane carrying the
Hutu president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarima, and his counterpart from Burundi, also a
Hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira.46 Months after the massacres became headline news, Jean
Kambanda, prime minister of the Rwandan (Hutu) government-in-exile, protested that the
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Tutsis had been the ones guilty of genocide against the Hutus.47 Kajuga, Kambanda, and
other Hutu extremists denied the existence of an organized massacre; instead, they
painted a picture of civil war, in which their side, the "patriotic" Hutus, engaged
primarily in self-defense, though some regrettable atrocities occurred.48
The crime of genocide and the United Nations
The source of one of Central Africa's recent turmoil was Rwanda. The politics of
genocide have been a planned, conscious strategy applied from 1 990 onwards. The
clique of powerful people around dictator Habyarimana (Akazu) superimposed a
pathological plan to murder all Tutsi and the political opposition among the Hutu in order
not to implement the plan of power sharing agreed in the Arusha Accords 1 993. 49
I analyze three phases of escalation from fall 1990. The first phase of escalation
began with the Uganda based invasion by the RPF rebels; it ended with Habyarimana's
MRND regime apparently giving way on the major points of contention in March 1 992.
At the same time, the extreme political polarization began, and the organizational
preparations for the genocide were expedited. The second phase of escalation was
triggered by the regime's concessions and ended with the signature of the Arusha peace
agreement in August 1 993. Against the background of the successful peace negotiations
of 1 992-93, this phase led to a hardening of the attitude of rejection and was
characterized by a continuation of preparations for the final solution, an intensive racist
propaganda campaign, and a perverting of the notion of democratization. The third phase
of escalation, from fall 1 993 until the start of the genocide in April 1 994, resulted in the
47
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whole state being taken over by the extremists and to the launch of a massive hate
campaign. During this phase, the failure of the United Nations to underpin and enforce
the Arusha peace became evident.
Getting the option of force established as part of government policy
From the time of the RPA invasion in October 1990, a terrible polarization began
to take place in society; there was an increase in right wing extremism and fascism, and
the option of force began to be established as part of government policy (Phase 1).
Alongside these destructive political developments, the organizational preconditions for
the genocide began to be systematically put in place on the orders of the Akazu power
elite. At the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, various state bodies began to push
ahead with the relevant preparations on a comprehensive basis and with great criminal
gusto. The society was militarized by means of mass recruitment to the army and
presidential guard based on the threat posed to the regime by the military invasion by
RP A rebels (October 1, 1990). The guerrilla war was confined to parts of the northern
hill country; therefore, the buildup of the militias had nothing to do with the fight against
the RPA. 50
The extremist, eliminatory ideology was not confined to a handful of misguided
individuals; it was developed and disseminated by paid Hutu extremists as an official
ideology. The destructiveness and pathological nature of Hutu extremism were revealed
already in 1991 in the genocide perpetrated on the small Bagogwe group in northwestern
Rwanda in January/February 1991. The ideological propaganda and relentless agitation
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of the Hutu population were intended to stimulate social envy. The extremists exploited
the inferiority complexes that had been implanted in colonial times in regard to the Tutsi
as alleged born rulers. This was even despite the fact that the Tutsi had, in reality, been
oppressed and persecuted since 1959.51 The media campaign to create fears about threats
to the overwhelming majority from the minority acquired plausibility as a result of the
lingering civil war under way in Burundi since the murder of the moderate FRODEBU
president Melchior Ndadaye (Burundi's first Hutu head of state) in October 1993.52
The force option was given an enormous legitimatory boost as a result of the
traditional moral authorities being taken into state ownership and as a result of the silence
of all the Christian churches. The increased involvement of the leadership and many
secular followers of the powerful Catholic Church became obvious. The negligence of
the Catholic Church was not simply a faux pas on the part of individual bishops,
missionaries, priests, or lay people. The church structures themselves were mobilized by
the clergy, most of whom were of an extremist bent, and by the mass of church-going
supporters and accomplices of the extremists. 53

Democratization and the preparations for the genocide
In March 1992, when Habyarimana gave in on the refugee question and declared
his willingness to enter into peace talks with the RPF, the destructive dynamic seemed to
have been halted. However, the formation of a coalition government in April 1992 soon
had a boomerang effect. Against the background of the successful peace negotiations in
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Arusha in 1992-93, the extremists took these concessions as a ground for intensifying the
campaigning. 54 This negative dynamic grew stronger with the first Arusha protocol in
August 1992, making the option of the use of force more acute within government policy.
The top-down perversion of democratization, following its introduction in March
1992, under external pressure and in conditions of permanent emergency, led to the
opposite of what was originally intended. The freedom to organize (foundation of
political parties) and freedom of the press were exploited without interference by the
Hutu extremists (to launch a massive campaign). The negotiations in Arusha were
obstructed by the regime and eventually failed on the question of the division of power
with opposition forces, notably the RPF (Arusha agreement of January 1993). 55 The
failure of the UN to react appropriately to repeated verifiable warnings of genocide is
inexcusable; an arms-embargo should have been declared in 199 1; hardly any criticism
was voiced of France's criminal policy in Rwanda. 56
State bodies coordinated the preparations for the genocide. The challenge
presented to the state and its monopoly on force by the countrywide build-up of the
militias belonging to the MRND (lnterahamwe) and CDR (lmpuzi) was only apparent; in
reality, the aim was to strengthen the state and ethnic monopoly on force. 57 The Hutu
nationalists secured a position of predominance; they got rid of the remaining moderates
by threats and political assassinations, put their own adherents into decision-making
positions, and worked constantly on public opinion. The general climate of brutalization
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was reinforced by the three pogroms against the ethnic minorities of the Bagogwe,
Bahima, and Bugesera-Tutsi perpetrated by Hutu extremists with official support
between 1991 and 1993. The victimization and dehumanization of all Tutsi was
deliberately escalated from the time of the Bugesera pogrom in 1992.
The failure of the UN: extremists gain control of the state apparatus
Most grave and unforgivable was the miscalculation of the situation by the UN at
the end of 1993. This happened despite the fact that accurate information was available
after the Milobs had presented UNAMIR force commander Romeo Dallaire with
alarming detailed reports, which Dallaire had faxed to the chief of UN peace operations. 58
The decisive development of Phase 3 is the seizure of the state's monopoly of
force by the extremists. It was not the loss of the monopoly on force that cleared the way
for the strategy of genocide in Rwanda, as some experts believed, overlooking the fact
that the monopoly on force had long since been captured. One cannot talk of a loss,
given that at no time was there a change in command and that the party militias were an
integral element in the Akazu's monopoly on force. The societal element, and also a
degree of social control, was undoubtedly present, but it was too weak compared with the
strong state.
The problem began when the monopoly on force was altered. Phase 3 was
marked by the take over of all state apparatuses by extremists, a massive hate campaign,
58
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and the broad dissemination of the pathological idea of obliteration among the population
characterized the situation from the time of the signature of the Arusha agreement in
August 1993, on the eve of the genocide. The escalation of this process of violence over
the last phase of approximately seven months, up to the start of the genocide on April 6,
1994, might still have been halted by outside intervention. Among the elements were:
The failure of the UN to back up the Arusha settlement, negotiated through the
intermediary of Tanzania and the OAU from June 1992 to August 1993, to ensure it was
implemented, and to make worst case preparations. The failure of the international
community was characterized by total absence of a coherent policy of conflict mitigation.
The six most important donor countries of the Habyarimana regime 199 1- 1993, Belgium,
Germany, France, USA, Switzerland, and Canada failed to suspend the aid flows. 59 Their
failure to use comprehensive conditionality was a crucial factor, which gave signals of
sympathy and support to the regime. Under the Anti-Genocide Convention of 1948 the
international community was obligated to intervene once early warnings had clearly
revealed the intention to destroy the Tutsi minority and the Hutu opposition.
The complete confusion caused among the Rwandan population by the campaigns
against alleged collaboration with the RPF and by the hate campaign conducted by the
private radio station, RTLM, was an important element. All the opposition parties in
Rwanda split into genocidal factions under pressure from the increasingly influential
Hutu extremists of the MRND and CDR. Violence against the Tutsi, against smaller
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minorities, and against the political opposition became normal. Violence was encouraged
by the absence of punishment for acts of terror against excluded minorities and
dissidents.
According to expert reports, public accusations by opposition politicians and
statements by the perpetrators themselves aimed to utilize the state to further prosecute
their genocidal campaign. Their declared aims were the extermination of the Tutsi and
the removal of the Hutu opposition. The extremists assumed control of almost all state
apparatuses having first acquired a greater following through state support; moderate
opposition members were reduced to just a handful in the state administration.
Several foreign secret services monitored the militias but Western governments
refrained from any pressures and did not intervene. The donors never conditioned the
large aid flows. Aid flows even increased by fifty percent since 1990: this was seen as a
clear signal of support by the akazu and the Hutu power extremists.60 On the eve of the
genocide, the militarists and fascist extremists were in command of the state monopoly
on force and were waiting for the signal to strike.
The shooting down of the dictator's aircraft by two ground-to-air missiles as it
came in to land at Kigali was taken by certain sections of the army and presidential guard
as an opportunity for the armed gangs to launch a strike against the opposition gangs.
The deliberate shooting down of the aircraft cannot be reinterpreted as a start to an
unplanned wave of bloodlust.
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The threat of a loss of power is crucial. The Akazu elite gave the order for the
mass murder when it saw its position of power jeopardized by Habyarimana' s promise
that the Arusha agreement would finally be implemented. 6 1 In the interests of preserving
its power, the Akazu elite made use of a racist ideology whose pathological consequence
was the annihilation of the minority and the molding of the majority into a nation of
murderers.
The perpetrators: organizers and executioners
The main bodies and organizations that carried out the genocide were the
presidential guard, two paramilitary youth organizations (the MRND Interahamwe and
the CDR Impuza Mugambi killer troops)62 , the army; and almost the entire state's
administrative apparatus. These bodies were the main perpetrators of the genocide, in
their capacity as executing authorities. Members of the higher professional groups and a
large proportion of church leaders and religious functionaries (not including the Muslims)
also played a major part as agitators and executive organs. The Christian churches,
including the Catholic Church, which, until very shortly before this, had claimed a
monopoly on public morality, remained tight lipped through it all. The ethnicist
ideologies preached by the missionaries and colonialists were immoral and abhorrent.
The apocalyptic end result of ideologies of exclusion is illustrated in the most horrific
way in Rwanda.

The Akazu power elite was the clique around Agathe Habyarimana, the "true ruler of Rwanda", and also
included financiers and military leaders who enjoyed the protection of the state.
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One of the aims of the Akazu power elite around the wife of the dictator
Habyarimana was to mobilize the mass of the people as volunteers, under orders, or
under constraint. It was intended that every Rwandan Hutu should participate in the
genocide. To ensure that the order was obeyed, a few hundred suitable party soldiers
were chosen from each community and trained as killers. Alongside the army, the
Interahamwe was the largest and most brutal killing organization. The policy of genocide
was the Akazu' s ultimate strategy of power retention. This clique of powerful
individuals around the dictator and his wife recruited not only the entire state apparatus as
an instrument of genocide, but the entire majority population of the Hutu, whom it called
upon and in some cases forced to destroy the national minorities and the opposition.63
The Hutu extremists assumed complete control over all the organs of the state and
the media. The medium most used by the extremists was the radio, the state-run Radio
Rwanda and the private Radio Televisio� des Milles Collines (RTLM). 64 These two
stations waged a racist and chauvinist campaign of encouragement against the Tutsi
minority and the political opposition waged over a period of months. On April 6, 1 994 at
6 p.m., RTLM gave the starting signal for the massacre. 65 Every day after this, Rwanda's
citizens were openly called upon to go out and do their job, in other words, murder all
Tutsis in the neighborhood.
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World public opinion reacted with outrage when CNN broadcast amateur videos
of people being hunted down, butchered, and savagely executed on the streets of the
capital, Kigali. One video in the ICRC archives, filmed from the Milles Collines hotel (to
which many foreigners had fled), showed victims being insulted and beaten. Rigid with
fear, the victims were made to kneel down in a row in the street and then, one after the
other, had their heads chopped off. Images of indescribable cruelty such as these
dominated international news coverage for no more than a few days. The reason is a
simple one. During the first week of the genocide, missionaries and development
workers provided the foreign media with some of their most reliable information; but
because all whites except a few missionaries and nuns then fled the country, this source
of information soon dried up. The reports then concentrated either on military activities,
on the UN' s indecision and futile gestures, or on the thousands of bodies of murdered
Tutsi washed ashore in Lake Victoria. Days later CNN and all the other television
stations began to focus on the streams of refugees. Exactly why the people were fleeing
was left unclear in many reports. 66
How the administration was exploited
Rwanda had a system of totalitarian control that was probably unique in Africa.
The central government was able to exert direct influence on events in the ten
prefectures, 147 local communities, and thousands of sectors and cells, right down to the
nyakumi (units of ten families). The cells and nyakumi were creations of the MRND
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party of unity and were introduced in the 1970s; they are grassroots units. 67 They are
alleged to have been introduced as a result of Habyarimana' s admiration for the Stalinist
system of repression, but they are also reminiscent of the block warden system operated
by the Nazis in Germany. (Similarities with fascist models are to be found in every
organizational aspect of the genocide.) As a result of all this, the order to hunt down and
kill the Tutsi was carried out within a few days in almost every part of the country.
Thanks to the totalitarian administrative apparatus perfected over a period of thirty-five
years, the authoritarian state's racist manipulation was comprehensive in its effect. The
utilization of the totalitarian administrative apparatus, with its five hierarchical levels, the
mobilization of all branches of the machinery of repression, the enforced recruitment of
civilians, a long-term organized campaign by the media-these were the elements that
helped ensure the devastating efficiency of the genocide. The regime's aim of securing
mass participation in the genocide through propaganda and force, equaled the creation of
a single people under a single leader. The guiding notion was not that of a single nation
embracing all Rwandans but that of an ethnically cleansed community of murderers
permanently bound together by a horrific bloody deed.
For the first time in modem history, a state succeeded in transformi�g the mass of
its population into murderers. To begin with, the presidential guard and the armed gangs
went around with long computer printouts listing the names of dissidents; these
individuals were hunted down and killed throughout the country from the very first
murderous night. The death squads and the presidential guard started on the planned
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bloodbath right from April 6, 1994, and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans
subsequently fell victim to it.68
The arrest of the popular prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (the leader of
the moderate wing of the Hutu-dominated MOR denounced as a traitress by the
extremists) and her murder along with her bodyguards, carried out in the most inhuman
way by the presidential guard was meant to spread fear and horror. 69 Executions, public
torturing, and the sadistic publicized elimination of dissidents formed the prelude to the
countrywide mass murder.
The role of the local authorities
The most important link in the chain was the civilian authorities. The great
majority of them proved willing instruments of the Akazu power elite's genocidal policy
when it came to organizing massacres in small towns, villages, and the hill country. The
officials not only passed on orders to kill Tutsi civilians; they facilitated the mass
slaughter by arranging the distribution of weapons and the transport of army troops and
death squads, by co-coordinating the deployment of professional killers, by organizing
the distribution of the possessions of those who had been murdered, and so on. The
mayors (bourgmestres) played a crucial role; they passed on the orders to kill to the heads
of sectors. Many obeyed out of subservience. The heads of sectors in their tum passed
the orders to the cell leaders.
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Not only did officials play a basic organizational part in ensuring that the
genocide was carried out countrywide; they often went beyond what was required of
them. Mayors summoned the local population to meetings at which agitators provoked
them to kill the resident Tutsis. All the possessions of the dead became the property of
the killers. Everyone was officially permitted to bum down houses belonging to Tutsis
and to slaughter and eat their cows. Minor officials were in charge of organizing the
production. These tasks had to be performed by officials in all the local communities
otherwise they themselves were killed by members of the presidential guard. Because
prefects, assistant prefects, and mayors were personally appointed by Habyarimana, they
were usually members of the MRND. After 1 990, some of them joined the genocidal
pawa (power) wing of the opposition parties. Many high-ranking officials were
themselves murderers. Most of them appear to have been in the habit of carrying a
weapon (usually an AK47), for quite a long time before this, ostensibly for security
reasons, and they made liberal use of these against Tutsi civilians during the genocide.
Only a handful of officials belonged to the opposition; they were among the first to be
killed.
According to concurring statements by survivors and eyewitnesses, in many
places (for example, in Nyakizu, Kigembe, and Kibayi, along the border with Burundi),
senior officials plotted the massacre of Tutsi refugees from inland who were making their
way in large groups to the borders. They demanded that the refugees register before
crossing the border, guaranteeing them a safe house in the local administrative buildings
or in buildings belonging to the parishes-only to use the time gained to organize the
deployment of the professional murderers, the militias and gendarmes, and, in some
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cases, the army. Community centers and schools became the setting for mass murders all
over the country, particularly along the borders.
Even in the smallest settlements, at the instigation of bureaucracy, the male Hutu
population was urged to arm themselves with pangas (long knives), axes, and clubs, and
go out and kill. Obedience to the orders of the authorities was something that had been
taught. In Rwanda, the authorities comprise not only the powerful mayors, but also the
sector and cell heads, the gendarmes, teachers, and the Catholic Church as represented by
parish priests, curates, and nuns. All the named local authorities were involved in the
genocide at the highest levels as organizers, encouragers, or role models.
The role of NGOs and the export of the politics of genocide
The effects of the African Holocaust in Rwanda were devastating: In the middle
of 1994 half of Rwanda's population was either killed or had fled the country. After the
genocide seventy percent of the population was women, many were ill treated and
raped. 70 Thousands of children are traumatized. The morale was broken, the social
fabric disintegrated, the economy shattered, the state administration was out of order.
Crucial for the regime was the non-reaction of the United Nations. Despite earli_er
warnings, the UN remained disunited, paralyzed, and inactive in the case of Rwanda.
The weeks of inactivity by the UN, in the face of the horrific organized massacre of Tutsi
civilians by militia forces, the police and the army, seem incomprehensible to many.
With that being said, investigation of the genocide and prosecution of the perpetrators
had since been very slow getting off the ground. The International Criminal Tribunal on
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Rwanda (ICTR) was struggling with budget problems and had too few people
investigating and too many administrating. In dealing with the genocide, the UN seemed
to be acting without any kind of plan.
The challenges of a complex emergency were too great for the international
community. The giant disaster relief went into the trap. Humanitarism wanted to fill a
political vacuum. Nobody was talking about justice, but all NGOs and UN agencies were
talking about aid. The separation of killers and refugees never took place. A chain of
huge refugee camps in the border areas consequently became military camps. Aid
contributed to lengthening a deadly conflict. Humanitarian NGOs lost their innocence
when it became clear that they were feeding perpetrators of genocide and prolonging a
deadly conflict. Infiltration of genocidal FAR and Interahamwe elements to Rwanda
went on throughout 1995 and 1996. Only the revolt of the Banyamulenge rebels in K.ivu
in fall of 1996 and the military defeat of the perpetrators of genocide in the camps
brought dramatic change. The return of 800,000 refugees from Congo-Zaire in
November 1 996 was followed by as many from camps in Tanzania. The mass return was
a new challenge for a ravaged country and had serious destabilizing effects in Rwanda
throughout 1997 and 1998.
The American position
The United States sounded a particularly strident voice of caution over the issue
of an expanded UN presence in Rwanda. As events unfolded in Rwanda, American
policy makers faced the specter of the Somalia disaster as they deliberated possible
options. In December 1992, American forces entered Somalia as part of a UN mission to
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feed starving people in a nation wracked by internal chaos. With the CNN broadcasting
images of the soldiers coming ashore to rescue the at-risk population, this gesture of
international goodwill seemed destined for success.7 1
Over the next year, the mission expanded from humanitarian relief to include
elements of nation building, helping Somalia establish some sort of workable, democratic
polity. As a result of this so-called mission creep, American forces found themselves at
odds with local Mogadishu warlords. This conflict culminated on October 3, 1993, with
a firefight between American Rangers, members of the Army's elite Delta Force, and
forces loyal to Mohammed Aideed. After hours of intense fighting, eighteen Americans
lay dead and seventy-three wounded. 72
Any loss of life is difficult enough, but Somalia earned its lasting legacy when
triumphant Somalis dragged the body of a perished American helicopter pilot through the
streets of Mogadishu. Covered in the news complete with video footage, the episode
seared powerful images into the memories of Americans. Somalia became a sobering
and formative experience for US policy.
In the military establishment, an angry belief that the Clinton administration had
failed to provide requested equipment and irritation at its subsequent hasty withdrawal
from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu contributed to a reluctance to commit
American forces to another UN mission, especially one in Africa. At the same time, the
dictates of domestic politics suggested few if any influential constituencies for American
involvement in Africa following the Somalia debacle. To put it simply, the president
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feared losing more votes and opinion poll percentage points than he would gain over any

African intervention.
The Pentagon based much of its position on a Somalia analogy, arguing that an
all-too-fine line existed between sending in UN forces and eventually having to follow up
with American soldiers. Pentagon officials were quite wary of having to bail out a
floundering UNAMIR and, therefore, opposed multilateral involvement at any level.
This was an understandable concern but one born of selective memory- the costly Battle
of Mogadishu had been an American not a UN operation. 73
It appears the United States operated under a significantly flawed understanding
and interpretation of events. In large part, the Clinton administration first mistakenly
identified and therefore discussed the Rwanda issue as a peacekeeping matter, as a more
or less traditional conflict between two armed forces. Therefore, any proposed action to
alleviate the situation in Rwanda fell under the rubric of peacekeeping and was far more
likely to fall victim to flawed analogies from the Somalia experience. It also make more
likely- and perhaps more understandable and defensible- extreme caution and trepidation
at the thought of interposing any foreign force between the warring parties no matter
what the reported loss of life.
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Chapter 6: The Rwandan Genocide in a Comparative Perspective
Interdisciplinary comparative genocide research is needed for effective prevention
of the crime of genocide. The comparative approach initially met difficulties. Fears of a
particular genocide being banalized and the radical claim of singularity for a particular
community of victims have to be taken seriously. However, the singularity of genocide
cannot be an obstacle for comparative research. The task is to explore accepted
categories for comparing genocidal processes. So far there is a minimal consensus
among the research community only about a few basic elements of genocide analysis
such as perpetrators, victims, motive, planning, preparation, execution, and result.
The singularity of the Rwandan genocide
Wanton brutality and inhumanity are not a peculiarly Rwandan, German, Turkish,
or Cambodian characteristic; they are a trait of all forms of totalitarian rule. The question
of how the genocide could have come about, of whether it was a case of a loss of social
controls or of the systematic planning and execution of mass murder by the state, is one
that has been posed by Dieter Neubert. 74 In fact, only a combination of the two factors
can explain it: the systematic nature and dynamic of the official genocide eroded, and
ultimately completely dissolved, social controls. The thesis, that it was only possible for
the preplanned genocide to be realized because there was an escalation of violence,
during which more and more people were caught up in the undertow of this process, runs
counter to my own thoughts. The thesis is based on the pattern seen in other genocides

74

Dieter Neubert, The Dynamics of Violence - Processes of Escalation and De-escalation in Violent
Group Conflicts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999).

42

and assumes the same for Rwanda. The uniqueness of the Rwandan genocide can been
seen in two related factors:
1 . Rwanda 1 994 was the first genocide in modem history, which was based on mass
participation of the common population. The most massive scale of slaughter ever
seen in human history would have been impossible without hundred of thousands of
willing executioners. Mass participation during a short period of time (99 days)
resulted in murderous efficiency.
2. The intensity of the slaughter was overwhelming from the very first day, from the
night of April 6-7, and it escalated into generalized butchery within hours.
Organized mass murder was committed across the whole country over the next days,
weeks, and months.
This is not to say that there was no process of escalation leading to the
generalization of massacres. This process had been started three and a half years earlier,
on October 1 , 1 990. Measured in terms of the number of people killed (rather than by
the way in which the killing was done) there was not an increase but a gradual decrease
in the slaughter. In some areas such as the Butare prefecture, generalized massacres took
place with a time lag compared to the rest of the country. 75
In parts of the hill country, there was renewed killing weeks after the first
massacres had taken place. Many of the victims had previously been spared, often
because their classification (Hutu/Tutsi) had been unclear or because someone had
offered them protection. Many spent weeks in hiding, only to be discovered later. The
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picture of people being caught up in the undertow is also a bad image in so far as the
process of escalation began months or years before the actual outbreak of violence,
triggered by the final order from high up that all Tutsi should be killed. The tendency of
violence needed for this had been worked up during the thirty-five years of ethnicized
rule and racial dictatorship.
An African holocaust
An eruption of violence like that which occurred in Rwanda in 1994, with the
capacity to unleash such a monstrous degree of inhumanity, can only happen within the
extreme framework conditions of totalitarianism, state terror, and organized barbarity.
Rwanda is a case of total full-scale genocide. In the twentieth century there were four
cases of total genocide. All key elements of a total genocide have been developed over
long periods of time. An aggressive ideology that aims at eradication is always based on
the culmination of pre-existing racist views, doctrines, and attitudes within a society. A
long period of dehumanization of the victims, and an ever-present fear among the little
people are present as well. Mass participation also needs incentives. An assurance of
immunity, reward, or illicit gain is required to bring people to a position where they will
act as instruments and willing agents of those in power, and in a way that contradicts all
notion of human dignity. 76
An analysis of the total genocides committed during the twentieth century shows
that there are common patterns. The most deadly regimes of this century (measured by
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yearly death rate) were responsible for barbaric attempts to annihilate their minorities. 77
Usually a situation of war or internal troubles provides the best cover for genocide. A
situation of confusion and jeopardy, in which uncertainty and fear thrive, is one of the
framework conditions for genocide. Rumors are deliberately fabricated from above, in
order to enhance the unc·ertainty. In the history of Rwanda since 1959, deliberate rumors
have played a key role in triggering violence. An atmosphere was created which
produced a kill or be killed psychosis in individuals.
The history of genocide since classical times yields a range of illustrative material
showing that as a rule, 1) genocides are carried out before, during, or after wars, mostly
in conditions of war, and that 2) ideological components play an important part in
concealing barbarity, in encouraging the population, and in providing a pretext or overall
racist construction to legitimize events. These elements are clearly displayed in the first
genocide of this century, against the Armenians in Turkey in 1915, decreed by the
Committee for Unity and Progress (the Young Turk elite that ruled after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire), and also in the destruction of the Roma in Europe in 1935-45 and the
Holocaust, the final solution to the Jewish problem in 1939-45, both decreed by the Nazi
leadership under Hitler.
The Young Turks justified their genocide by reference to the alleged danger of
Armenian collaboration with their archenemy Russia. Hitler excluded the Roma on the
77 These mass murders of civilians took place in the context of war: Pol Pot's Cambodia (1975-9) claimed
2 million victims, with genocide being perpetrated against Chinese, Muslim (Cham), and Vietnamese
minorities; Young Turk Turkey (1909-23) produced 1.4 million victims in the genocide of the Armenians
in 1915-18, plus half a million other victims from 1915-23; the Ustacha regime in Croatia (1941-4) was
responsible for a genocide of 650,000 Serbs, Jews, and Roma; the Islamic fundamentalist NIF regime in
Sudan (1989-94) carried out the genocide of 1.5 million Nuba, Dinka, and other people of southern and
central Sudan.
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grounds that they were inferior, and placed the blame for the Second World War both on
international Jewish finance and Jewish Bolshevism. The Akazu power elite initially
justified its genocide by claiming that the Tutsis, having killed the president, were out to
kill all Hutus. For the extremists of Hutu Power, the aim was to complete the revolution
begun in 1959. However senseless, irrational, and pathological such explanations are,
they are still a crucial part of the overall picture. 78
Violence and destruction to the point of self-ruination
Irrational traits figure prominently in Nazi and in Hutu-Power barbarity. In both
cases, violent processes were taught and planned like a military operation but ultimately
became uncontrollable. This meant that interests from the beginning, and military,
power-political, and economic considerations became obsolete as these violent processes
ran their course. The exterminism of the Nazis and of the Hutu extremists turned into
self-destruction.
All the prerequisites and deliberate, strategic measures that constitute the
conditions for totalitarianism, state terror, and organized barbarity were present in
Rwanda in over determined form. I demonstrate this by reference to the elements, which
I mentioned earlier as being necessary for social controls to be eroded and genocide to be
carried out. Among the most important of these is an aggressive ideology that aims at
extermination, the dehumanization of the victims, other mechanisms for provoking the
perpetrators, generalized fear, and war as a cover. Finally, there is the molding of the
perpetrators, the loyal subjects, without whose delusional obedience and excessive trust
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in authority no genocide could take place. In the course of my demonstration, I will
make a step-by-step comparison of Rwandan Tutsi genocide and the Holocaust.
Ethnicization, exterminatory ideology, and dehumanization
Unless we can explain the inexplicable, we will not find any answers to the
question of what can be done in Rwanda to deal with the consequences of the genocide
and to ensure that what has happened can never be repeated. I am aware that my attempt
at an explanation is neither complete nor conclusive. It does not begin at zero and is not
essentially concerned with understanding a foreign culture. Over the last one hundred
years, the influence of large numbers of missionaries, colonial officials, experts, and
development workers in Rwanda-Burundi has led to a marked erosion of indigenous
culture.
Alongside South Africa, Rwanda is the most Europeanized country in Africa. It
was not only a country that was colonized; so were the minds of the people. What I talk
about in the following pages is a barbarity that touches us all and with which all of us are
familiar. The very same murderous ideology, rooted in nineteenth-century Germany,
manifested itself in German fascism and in Hutu extremism. This racist ideology, the
blatant inhumanity of claims about differing worth within the human species, was
translated into physical violence in just the same way in the Holocaust and in the
genocide against the Tutsi.
The aggressive ideology of ethnicization (extremist Hutuism) came into being
during the 1950s in the path of the church, notably in the seminaries. It is a misdirected,
opportunistic reaction by the new Hutu elite to the splitting of the Rwandan nation for the
purposes of indirect rule and to the related creation of a social order, characterized by
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scandalous inequality and the vile degradation of the Hutu majority. The influence of the
missionaries, colonial officials, and Catholic Church had played a decisive part in
bringing about the desperate plight of the oppressed and slighted. The elite abused the
justified rage of the masses to advance its own struggle for power. The misdirected
ethnicist Hutuism of the new elites was targeted not at those responsible for the situation
(the colonial states and the church), but at their tools, the Tutsi. In its capacity as an
ethnicized social group, the Tutsi aristocracy had been utilized as part of the colonial
plan, as a means of securing indirect rule, and this entailed an extensive reorganization of
the pre-colonial system of rule.
In Rwanda, eliminatory extremism was something that came from above. As in
Nazi Germany, the highest-ranking representatives of the state were quite brazen in their
support of it. As mentioned before, over thirty years ago, President Kayibanda, a person
of the Swiss archbishop Parraudin, had threatened the extinction of the Tutsi as a race. 79
Hitler was already writing about the Final Solution in the 1920s and gave notice of the
"destruction of the Jewish race in Europe" 80 in the Reichstag at the start of 1939. The
Jews, of course, like the Rwandan Tutsi, are not a race but a religious community and/or
social group. Their exclusion as a race was based on the general racism in the Europe of
the nineteenth century and its infamous theory of the races. Racism permeated not only
the racial teachings of Count Gobineau, classical German philosophy, and the science of
ethnology, but also religious ideologies, as in the case of the newly strong age-old anti
Semitism of the Catholic Church and other Christian churches. Racial ideologies shaped
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the thinking of the Germans and other colonizers about the people they subjugated. They
also had a destructive impact on the thinking of those who were colonized.
The dehumanization of the Jews by German fascism is a criminal form of
scapegoat ideology, just like the dehumanization of the Tutsi as cockroaches and broods
of vipers. It is no coincidence that a German missionary should have been asked to
translate Hitler's inflammatory text, Mein Kampf, into Kinyarwanda. The policy of Tutsi
dehumanization is as old as Hutu domination and has produced its own symbols and
language, familiar to every child in Rwanda.
Broadcasting of the inflammatory propaganda
Fear is a dominant element in all rigid, hierarchical societies. In the case of
Rwanda, the tyranny of earlier centuries has helped bring about a situation in which the
population's fear is almost a natural state. An assurance of impunity for the perpetrators
is therefore a key element. The appeal to fear and primitive instincts provided an
effective catalyst for the genocidal policy._
The radio was the main instrument of indoctrination both in Nazi Germany and in
Rwanda. The RTLM radio station was set up in 1993 by the black Nazi Nahimana, with
the aid of the Christian Democrat Internationale and equipment from Bavaria. 8 1 The
relentless primitive campaigning eroded resistance and sought to give the racist creation
an appearance of normality in the eyes of the masses. The spreading of the inflammatory
propaganda was achieved via the major private and public media. This obvious abuse of
press freedom was also a result of the combination of the external top-down
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democratization that had been going on since mid- 1990 and the stop-start process of war,
cease-fires, and the Arusha talks. 82
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Chapter 7: A Comparison of Perpetrators: The Executioners of the Final Solution
Debates among Holocaust scholars can be instructive for those attempting to
analyze the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Such discussions help to highlight important
questions to be explored and relevant issues that demand attention. One thing that should
be noted here is that the war, in the sense of armed hostilities between the FAR and RPA,
was only happening in a concrete sense in a limited area in the northern mountains, but
had been turned inward as a permanent state of emergency. War and genocide were
entwined with one another not at a substantial level, but solely at the level of the
propaganda put out by a suffering regime and as a perfect cover for the preparations for
the planned final solution that were now in full swing.
Among fruitful areas of comparison, the role of the state in sanctioning,
mobilizing, and organizing genocide is critical. In the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as in
Germany during the Holocaust, a modem bureaucratic state organized the forces of
violence, mobilized its citizens, and directed them to kill people of a particular
category. 83

In Germany there was a principal target- Jews- and several secondary targets. So
too in Rwanda, the principal target was people of the Tutsi ethnic category, but Hutu
political dissenters and opponents to the government were also targeted. In both cases
the role of the state was important in the use of propaganda as a tool of the perpetrators.
Drawing on models from elsewhere, especially southeastern Europe and Somalia,
early reports in the international media cast the violence in Rwanda as a result of state
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collapse, which released ethnic tensions and primitive violence. But in Rwanda, as in
Germany, this was not a case of the implosion of the state; rather, the violence involved
use of the state apparatus to carry out the conscious policy of a faction within the
government. Massive killing on the scale of what occurred during the Holocaust and in
Rwanda is a modern phenomenon, enabled by modern technology. 84 In Germany the
centralized death camps and mass killings made the state presence evident throughout. In
Rwanda, too, although much killing was done by machete, the power of the state was a
prevalent presence: guns and grenades were used to kill people gathered in churches and
stadiums; members of the Interahamwe militias were often former policemen or soldiers
trained in the use of modern weapons; and political leaders broadcast hate messages on
the radio.
Soldiers, police officers, and officials blindly operate on orders under totalitarian
regimes. Fanatics motivated by political or moral convictions do more than merely carry
out orders; most importantly, they do it with deliberation and in full conscience without
inhibition. Nazi Germany and the Habyarimana regime could both count on the latent
readiness of broad sections of the population to resort to violence. In Rwanda there was
an especially large number of perpetrators of this kind, probably between several hundred
thousand and a million farmers and youths. They were afforded the opportunity to
torture and kill by hand. In contrast, the Holocaust of the Jews and the porajmos
(destruction of the Roma), first implemented by mass executions, later became industrial
in nature and could be carried out with much less directly involved manpower.
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Why did men who were apparently normal citizens engage in murder?
Another useful area of comparison with the Holocaust is found in questions about
who participated in the violence. As in the case of the Holocaust, the conduct of
perpetrators and their followers in Rwanda requires careful analysis. Reference to the
experiments of Milgram, to intensive indoctrination, and to the conditions prevailing in a
dictatorship still do not suffice to answer the question of why normal citizens engaged in
murder. 85 A new historians dispute broke out in 1 996, prompted by Daniel Goldhagen' s
broad-based investigation into exterminatory anti-Semitism. Goldhagen focused not only
on the fascist ideologues and behind-the-scenes masterminds of the Third Reich, but on
the actual executioners and agents of the so-called final solution.86 In Auschwitz, seven
thousand SS criminals managed the industrial-style annihilation of more than a million
Jews. The systematic mass shootings that were carried out in Eastern Europe involved
four special taskforces containing thirty-eight police battalions made up of sixteen
thousand German police officers. 87
The spearhead of the executioner-force
In Rwanda, the most criminal of the forces, the presidential guard, comprised a
troop comparable to the SS, officially numbering between six and eight hundred, but
probably fifteen hundred strong, trained under the supervision of French riot-control
experts. The total manpower of the fanaticized professional force of the Interahamwe
(originally hit men of the MRND party), a kind of Rwandan SA, rose to about five
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thousand in 1993-94, with a further 60,000 - 100,000 killers in reserve. In each local
community (Rwanda's 1 47 communes) there were several hundred trained and armed
militiamen. 88
The most horrific murder organization in history, the German SS, was merely the
leaders of a multinational executioner force, to which were added, in each region,
thousands of native fascists and extremists (Austrians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians,
Western Ukrainians, Hungarians, etc.) who were directly involved as perpetrators, plus
hundreds of thousands of police in all the occupied countries, along with soldiers,
officials, drivers, and other groups of workers, who provided backup for the mass
murder. 89
In Rwanda, along with the army (35,000-40,000), the gendarmes (5,000), and the
local police, about 100,000 soldiers, functionaries, and volunteers, all armed with the
latest weaponry, took part in the killing. 90 In the south of the country, Burundian Hutu
refugees made up a particularly large proportion of those involved in the slaughter of the
Rwandan Tutsi.
Wholesale collective guilt: willing agents?
In the case of the Holocaust, at least half a million Germans were actively
involved as direct perpetrators or accessories; millions more, while not getting their own
hands dirty, rendered themselves guilty of involvement as agitators, informants, or
bystander. This means that perhaps one percent of the eighty million Germans of the
time were willing agents of the Holocaust.
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One willing group not involved in the killing but directly responsible politically
was the membership of the National Socialist party (NSDAP). One in eight adult
Germans was a member of this criminal organization. In a certain sense, one in three
Germans (the number that voted for the NSDAP in free and secret elections in 1932)
shared in the political responsibility and the guilt. The bourgeois political class and the
military-industrial complex, which had made Hitler chancellor and brought Nazi fascism
to power, rendered themselves guilty. Anyone who wanted to find out what sort of
people he or she was voting for could do so. Hitler had given clear advance notice of the
Holocaust ten years previously (in Mein Kampf). Kayibanda had threatened the Tutsis
with extinction thirty years previously.
Why was there only feeble resistance?
Anyone looking for collective guilt of a verifiable kind will have no trouble
finding it in Rwanda. Estimates put the rate of participation amongst the mass of male
Hutu farmers at 4�6%; 9 1 among the higher professions, the percentage was
significantly more- 60--80%. 92 Measured in terms of the sheer numbers of victims and
the speed of the mass murder, the tragedy in Rwanda (in April and May 1994) attained
the same level as, and surpassed, the destruction brought down on the Jews and Roma by
the Holocaust. In Rwanda too, there was almost no open Hutu opposition to the carrying
out of genocide; and though there was probably broad passive resistance, this became
more and more weak as the killing went on. Every fourth person in Rwanda's Hutu
population was probably directly involved in the genocide, and millions rendered
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themselves indirectly responsible. Despite huge pressure, many Hutus did not participate
in the killing, not even as accessories. Consequently, they also refused to leave the
country along with the killers.
It may be argued that the active organized resistance to the Nazi dictatorship was
quickly smashed. But it was only after the havoc wreaked by the Gestapo on the internal
enemy on the left, and after the state organized mass murders of the left-wing opposition,
the communists, social-democrats, and other antifascists (the true resistance fighters and
first occupants of the concentration camps and death camps) that the militant resistance
diminished virtually to none. The assertion that there were no identifiable forces fighting
fascism, war, and genocide in Germany is therefore entirely untrue. In official Federal
German historiography, the old established German political elite were recast in the mold
of militant resistance fighters, and the allegedly relevant parts of the churches (which for
centuries had been a safeguard of anti-Semitism and had collaborated closely with the
Nazi regime) were transformed into an opposition. Such inventions are part of the myths
that have repeatedly been told in recent German history. Similar myths about resistance
are being invented on an individual basis in Rwanda; mostly they originate from
politicians who retrospectively had nothing to do with it all, did not know anything about
the preparations, and could do nothing about the killing.93
Well known threats of destruction became grisly realities
The majority of Germans must have known about the genocide perpetrated on the
Jews and Roma. Several hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Germany were taken
away. Synagogues were burnt down in November 1938. Like the Tutsi in Rwanda,
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Jewish Germans were beaten up and killed on the streets before the organized eradication
began. In January 1 939, Hitler threatened the Jews with extinction, just as Leon
Mugesera (vice-president of the MRND) threatened that all Tutsis would be sent back to
Ethiopia by the shortest route, meaning as corpses via the Nyabarango River. In both
cases, these threats of destruction became grisly realities-in the case of Rwanda about
eighteen months later.
The latest historians' dispute of 1 996, was concerned with the perpetrators, with
the readiness of ordinary citizens to use violence at the time of fascist totalitarian rule,
and with the question "Why?" The huge historiographical gap in knowledge about the
categories of people who acted as agents has finally begun to be closed-decades after
the German genocide. For some, the question "Why?" inevitably raises the question of
the specifically German national character. Others point to the centuries old Western
Christian problem of anti-Semitism, make reference to the incredible racism of the
nineteenth century and explore the links these two elements have with fascism and
militarism. No one talks of a Rwandan national character, because, since the introduction
of German racial theories in about 1 900, the Rwandan nation has been viewed only as
disconnected individual components.
Despite apparently very different complex backgrounds, examination of the
ideological, structural, and material framework conditions governing the Holocaust and
the Rwandan disaster brings a host of similarities and shared features to light. No highly
developed metropolitan state and no industrial style extermination in gas chambers and
ovens is required for racist European ideologies to be translated into reality. The

57
structures of a dictatorial Third World state and destruction by hand, with grenades,
rifles, and long knives, will do the job in peripheral areas of the world.
Collective moral responsibility
Any idea of wholesale collective guilt on the part of the Germans or the Rwandan
Hutus cannot be proven rationally. In the case of Rwanda, organized internal opposition
to the dictatorship was weak. The church leaders, particularly the Catholic ones,
collaborated closely with the regime. There was little opportunity for an independent
civil society to express itself. Many critics of the regime fell victim to assassination
attempts by the death squads. The opposition that emerged as a result of the
democratization introduced by donor countries was very weak.
Known members of the opposition were the first to be hunted down and murdered
that April; but the majority of the political class either maintained a fearful silence or
collaborated openly with the extremists and the genocidal regime. The idea of collective
guilt is not plausible; the idea of collective moral responsibility, on the other hand, may
well be. All Rwandans have a collective responsibility to fight racism and fascism so that
totalitarianism and genocide are never again allowed to occur.
More comparisons to the Holocaust
Comparing the genocide in Rwanda to the Holocaust is useful in delineating the
legal definition of genocide and the importance of honoring international conventions
relating to it. As is well known, the original catalyst for the UN convention on genocide
was a commitment in the international community after WWII not to allow such violence
again. When genocidal killing engulfed Rwanda in April 1994 signatories to the
convention on genocide had an obligation to take action; as human rights organizations,
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NGOs, and individual scholar-activists pointed out at the time, this clearly was a case of
genocide. And like the Holocaust, this type of killing, with the power of the state behind
it, was not something that ordinary unarmed individuals could stop alone- only organized
force with command of modern weapons could do that.
Holocaust denial is yet another area where comparisons can be helpful. As with
those who have tried to deny the existence of the Nazi gas chambers used to exterminate
the Jews of Europe, some Rwanda�s associated with the pre-genocide government of the
ex-FAR deny there was a genocide in Rwanda. Yet all the evidence contradicts that
position.94
Finally, literature on the Holocaust can help to conceptualize the profound effects
of this tragedy in shattering Rwandan society and traumatizing its people. As Rwandans .
have attempted to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of the genocide, they are aware that
things will never be the same as before. Efforts to preserve the memory of what
happened and honor victims of the violence serve both to shape collective group
consciousness and to transmit the hurt to the next generation.
The imperative of justice
In a post genocide situation the imperative is justice. The base for integration and
reconciliation in Rwanda is the application of justice and the rule of law. The new law
from August 1996 introduced new legal procedures to deal with the perpetrators of
genocide. Four years after the beginning of the worst genocide since the Holocaust not
much justice had been done. Rwandese criminal courts had the first 304 trials in 1997
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and 864 in 1998, with 130,000 waiting in overcrowded jails. 95 The much better funded
UN Tribunal remained until 1998 in the phase of preparation. In Arusha only a few of
the now thirty-five detained perpetrators of genocide are among the authors of the
genocide.
The international community is asking itself what can be done. Without some
measure of justice, there can be no thought of reconciliation in Rwanda. The sheer
number of murderers and criminals is enough to overburden any judicial system;
alternative modes of proceeding are therefore required. Nuremberg-style tribunals would
have to take place on every one of the thousands of hills in Rwanda and Burundi in order
to have a healing and preventive effect. Nationwide truth commissions operating both
from below and from above are needed. In many communities, traditional arbitration
bodies (gachacha) have spontaneously been reactivated. Following the return of two
million refugees in 1996 and 1997, it is urgent that such efforts are supported.96 The
spontaneous reactivation of a grassroots plan for arbitration, known as Gachacha, in
many municipalities gives rise to hopes.
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Chapter 8: Contribution of Comparative Research to Genocide Prevention

Interdisciplinary comparative genocide research is an outcome for effective
prevention of the crime of genocide. The comparative approach initially met difficulties.
Fears of a particular genocide being banalized and the radical claim of singularity for a
particular community of victims have to be taken serious. However, the horror of
genocide cannot be an obstacle for comparative research. The task is to explore accepted
categories for comparing genocidal processes. So far there is a minimal consensus
among the research comm�nity only about a few basic elements of genocide analysis
such as perpetrators, victims, motive, planning, preparation, execution, and result.
Consensus is the distinction between oppression and systematic extermination.
Policy deficits cause destabilization
Mass murder of members of minority groups (with states proving impunity to the
killers) is the worst form of destructive interaction between states and nations /
nationalities. Especially state organized mass murder and crimes ·against humanity such
as ethnocide, democide, politicide, and genocide are a matter of great impact on
international relations. They cause enormous human suffering and affect the stability of
entire world regions, as recent cases in Southeast Asia, the Hom of Africa, and Central
Africa have exhibited in the most drastic way. There is no systematic research going on
nor is there an accountable and comprehensive policy of the international community to
prevent all out mass violence against non-dominant groups.
Indicators for genocide prevention
A dozen broad categories cover in my view the main aspects of genocidal
processes. A comparative approach would look at the genocidal society in general and
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the perpetrators in particular, the development of a exterminatory ideology, the victims as
constructed by the perpetrators, motivations, the process of victimization, the central role
of the state and its transformation, process characteristics and dynamics, external
framework, historic context, the consequences of the crime, the reactions, and the post
genocidal cover up.
The process of escalation is being characterized in order to combat and prevent
the crime of genocide (see Table 2). The purpose is to picture the situation of continuous
aggravated crisis within each broad category, finally leading to the execution of the crime
of genocide.

62
Table 2: Early Warning and Genocide Prevention Indicator Box
95 indicators of successive escalation within ten broad categories
Genocidal society (1)
1 . Characteristics and manipulation of the
perpetrator society
2. Mobilization of past negative experiences
3. Construction of the "problem"
4. Reinforcement and manipulation of old
stereotypes
5. Reinforcement of prejudice, intolerance
and antipathies
6. Encouraging disposition and readiness for
use of violence against the victims
7. Construction of threats
8. Building a solid base of confusion and
insecurity

Construction of the victim group by the
perpetrators (3)
16. Identifying victims
17. Defining the gray zone of mixed elements
18. Signifying victims
19. Deluding vigilance among the victims
20. Ensuring and reinforcing the
defenselessness of the victims
21. Destroying unity, solidarity and resistance
among the victims by all means
The making of a genocidal state (5)
31. Infiltration the state machinery / silencing
moderate leaders
32. Deepening the general situation of
political crisis and disorientation
33. Creation of more confusion and fear
34. Division of roles/labor between authorsideologists and the state apparatus
35. Free hand for planers of crime of genocide
36. Free hand for propagandists
37. Extremists take over media
38. Coercion of the state bureaucracy for
"purification" (campaign of fear)
39. Exclusive ideologies in schools and public
places

Development of an exterminatory ideology
by the perpetrators (2)
9. Replacing unitary and emancipatory
categories of nationhood
10. Categories of order in "nation building"
11. Purified exclusive "national idea"
12. Futility, "falseness'" and "danger" of
aliens being assimilated into the nation
13. Primitivization of alleged ''utopian
conceptions", borrowed from ethnocentric philosophy & nationalist ideology
14. "Purposeful rationality" vs. psychopathological aspects
15. Anti-individualistic bias in the
construction of dichotic collectivities: us I
them; nationals / vermin; perpetrators I
victims
The process of victimization (4)
22. Excluding victims from the scope of
normal procedures
23. Systematic spreading of gossip
24. Heinous rumors about the victims
25. Public humiliation and harassment of
victims by extremists in daily life
26. Impunity for crimes against the victims
27. Associating victims with all evils
28. Unsanctioned hate propaganda
29. Dehumanizing victims
30. Demonizing victims
Negative dynamics of totalitarism (6)
40. Establishing lines of command for the
"final solution" of the "problem"
41. Mobilization of the state bureaucracy for
planning / organizing genocide
42. Coercive mobilization of civil servants
43. Secret systematic preparation of the final
solution
44. Organization of special troops, militias
and/or gangs
45. Training of the executioners
46. Spreading of mass hatred
47. Creating of the "ripe moment"

48. Ruthless execution of the crime by all
means
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Table 2: Continued
Development of a conductive social-political
Development of a genocidal environment
environment (7)
(8)
49. Propagandist onslaught to win over the
56. Brainwashing in schools / public places
national population
57. Permanent hate propaganda in the state
50. Supply of ambiguous identification
controlled media: lies, falsifications,
possibilities
fabrications, gossip
5 1 . Normalcy and necessity of escalation
58. Compulsory use of derogatory
52. Undermining social solidarity with victims
expressions for victims
amongst the perpetrator society
59. Humiliating expressions for alleged
53. Diffusion of normalcy
accomplices of the victims
54. Normality of "special procedures"
60. Attempt for breaking down the
55. Appeals to complicity (supply of more
(traditional) moral order
privileges)
6 1 . Public chasing and beating of victims
Building of a totalitarian state and
establishing of total state control (9)
62. Decapitation of opposition
63. Liquidation of the political opposition
64. Liquidation of all dissent
65 . Public humiliation of neutral personalities
66. Showing resolute ruthless leadership
67. Open criminal agitation
68. Intentions of the killers become know
69. Appeal to the most primitive instincts
70. Arbitrary arrest of doubtful nationals
7 1 . Exhibiting final determination of the top
leader(s) and his/their ring leaders
72. Public acts of violence against last rest of
former opposition
73. Open violence against victim group
74. Spreading and generalizing fear
Conductive context for genocide:
War or crisis as smoke screen (11)
82. Skilful interpretation of contradictions in
top leaders' policy
83. Skilful use of framework of war and crisis
84. Delusion of the international community
85 . Use of emergency situation to cut access
to information
86. Play of diplomatic dementia
87. Tricking international media
88. Use of the ripe moment
89. Presentation of an all-out operation as
singular acts for foreign consumption

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Preference for the option of outright
violence and extermination ( 10)
Construction of the "problem"
Reinforcing its plausibility
Breaking resistance among the "national"
population
Supplying a problem-solving model
Invitations for fatalist acceptance of state
terror
Creating the full atmosphere for
extermination
Executing the problem-solving model

Misinformation and denial (12)
Misinformation campaign claiming
punitive acts and preventive action
Launching well-prepared cover-up
operations by the perpetrators
Banalizing the crime of genocide claiming
isolated events, unfortunate incidents,
individual cases of wrongdoers, etc.
Threatening or silencing witnesses
Destruction of evidence (especially
official documents)
Outright denial of genocide

64

Chapter 9: Perspectives for Genocide Prevention
Comparative genocide research might well contribute to the development of a

global early warning system (e.g. by working on reliable indicators) and to establish
effective structural prevention of genocide. Quantitative indicators to measure economic
and political discrimination of ethnic groups by state governments and indicators to
measure the use of violence by governments have been developed by Gurr and Barff.97
The idea is to develop qualitative indicators for minorities at risk of genocide without
excluding possible quantitative aspects.
Searching for signs of eminent danger and identifying indicators for alert
Global data collections showing low and high scales of discrimination of
minorities are of special interest since discrimination as an essential aspect of the
victimization process characterizing every genocide. 98 Danger is eminent in the category
of highest discrimination. The measures applied by states are similar to those of
genocidal processes, such as formal and deliberate exclusion and/or recurring repression.
According to the findings of the Minorities-at-risk Project nearly a fifth of all
minorities at risk suffer deliberate exclusion and repression by state actors, with a
disproportionate concentration of minorities at high risk in Middle East and Africa.99 The
severity of discrimination is greatest in the Middle East and among ethno-classes. 1 00 The
latter category is particular prominent in the Central African region of the Great Lakes.
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Genocide prevention includes the abolition of impunity for gross human rights violation
and gives a clear signal to potential perpetrators. The base for reconciliation is justice.
Development of indicators for a system of effective early warning
Indicators warning of serious risk of genocide or mass violence against vulnerable
groups can be deduced from the escalation patterns explored within the previously
mentioned ten comparative categories. In order to remove indicators of alert for the
purpose of on-the-spot-monitoring of human rights violations and early warning it would
be necessary to assemble the identified elements of genocidal processes according to
stages of urgency and significance. Indicators would be deduced as signifiers for high
alert.
The challenge of genocide prevention is chiefly the identification of aspects of
significant aggressiveness, the timely reading of signs for growing determination of the
perpetrators in the genocidal process, and the identification of triggers of rapid escalation.
Table 3 gives an overview of the tasks, preceedures, institutions, and voids of genocide
prevention. I focus on areas of activities, which are essential to combat and eliminate
genocide: Early Warning, Early Action, Persecution and Deterrence, Enforcement of
International Law, Pressure, Vigilance and Protection, and, Lessons Learned.
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Table 3: Systematic Overview on the Tasks, Precedures, Institutions and Voids of
Genocide Prevention: Critical Areas of Activities
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•

•

•
•
•

Early Warning
Global monitoring of gross human rights
violations shall be coordinated
Clear-cut indicators for early warning
about serious risk of genocide
Development of an integrated early
warning and early response system
Special UN task force for processing data
on minorities-at-risk and development of
behavior of dangerous gangster regimes
Permanent information of UN Security
Council and key decision makers about
high-risk situations (minorities at risk)
Persecution and Deterrence
Mandatory persecution for perpetrators of
genocide in anyone state
Establishment of special persecution
institutions / ending impunity
A permanent international tribunal for the
crime of genocide shall be
institutionalized as integral part of the
UN system
ICC established and adhered to
International criminal law has to be
developed in order for the rule of law to
be respected by all states and political
actors
Pressure, Vigilance and Protection
UN, regional organizations and donor
states shall impose conditions or
disincentives on development aid in case
of abuse, violations, threats, state
criminality
Incentives shall promote democratization,
respect for basic human rights and
minority rights, rule of law, good
governance
Monitoring risk areas and minorities at risk
(by INGOs, local NGOs, IGOs, etc.)
Averting genocide I breaking escalation
through presence and media coverage
Rapid and broad system of protection of
possible victims

•
•
•
•

Early Action
High level diplomacy in cases of alert
Development of new mechanisms of rapid
reaction in cases of red alert
Organizing political will for averting
genocide
Organizing political will for mandatory
military intervention of UN and
protection of the victims in case of
genocide

Enforcing International Law:
• by comprehensive review processes and
checks-and-control, as in the case of the
European Convention on Human Rights
or in the case of the ILO convention 169
• by institution building, as in the case of
OSCE (e.g. High Commissioner for
Minorities), or the ICC, in order to
outlaw gross human rights violations
such as genocide and crimes against
humanity (ICC is still meeting strong
resistance by large states such as USA
and France)
• by refining an arsenal of sanctions, which
shall hurt the regimes not the people
Lessons Learned
• Learning from experience of genocidefree regions of the world
• Fighting powerlessness and passive
response on genocide
• Development of concepts of structural
prevention of genocide
• Writing genocide prevention into statutes,
domestic laws, constitutions,
international conventions, pacts, etc.
• Standardizing prevention of genocide and
mass violence internationally
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Conclusions
Despite impressive growth in international law outlawing crimes against
humanity and even with war crimes tribunals, the world has failed to deter genocide and
large-scale ethnic violence and to prosecute offenders. Meanwhile, billions of dollars
have been provided for humanitarian relief, tens of thousands of peacekeepers have been
deployed, hundreds of commissions have written thousands of reports, and a library of
scholarly research and writing has been published. But can we not do better?
The Geneva War Conventions protect the rights of civilians in warfare, prohibit
hostage talcing and reprisals, excessive military actions, torture, summary executions, and
hold states and armies accountable for compliance. Recently, some of these provisions
have been extended to internal wars, not just wars between states. Most of these
prohibitions and others not listed here have been violated on a massive scale in Rwanda,
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Why?
International law itself is contradictory. A cornerstone of the international order
is the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. According to the legalist
paradigm in international relations, the international system establishes for states the
rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The use of force by one state
against the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression
and is a criminal act. The moral argument for intervention by outsiders is justified when
a state continually uses violence, terror, and genocide against its people. The legalist and
moral principles are contradictory. The United Nations as an institution was not designed
to deal with aggression of a state against its own citizens. The notion of a just war, of
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humanitarian intervention to stop a government that commits crimes against humanity on
its own citizens, seldom supplants the principle of state sovereignty. The permanent
members of the Security Council and their close allies have partisan interests in ethnic
conflicts that override humanitarian intervention, unless it is a precedent against their
own and their allies' ethnic problems. The permanent members can veto UN action, and
the UN needs their military, logistic, and financial support for effective prevention of
genocide. Endless diplomacy can be a cover and excuse for avoiding effective
intervention. Domestic public opinion is difficult to mobilize before massacres occur,
and is sensitive to casualties from peacekeeping in distant places. Economic sanctions
imposed after genocides are evaded. War crimes tribunals have not deterred. The
chances are small that the war criminals and perpetrators of genocide will be brought to
justice. Current modes of international intervention in ethnic conflict and current
enforcement of international law on crimes against humanity have not prevented
genocide. Our best bet is crisis intervention with military force, in the short run, and a
democratic constitution and regime tailored for societies divided on ethnicity, 101 and the
institutions that sustain democracy, in the long run.
I have compiled a list of my findings and those from previous scholarship about
genocide. Would these indicators have provided early warning in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda? The answer is a resounding yes. Rwanda had a previous genocide in 1962; it
was an ethnically stratified society; it had a non-democratic military regime; France was
a powerful protector; the descendants of the Tutsi victims formed the Rwanda Patriotic
Front and had invaded with a military force; the Rwanda government was losing the war;
101
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the regime was forced into a negotiated settlement of power sharing with the RPF and the
return of half a million Tutsi refugees. With state support, the extremist anti-Tutsi party,
the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, and top people close to the president
mounted a radio and leaflet campaign of hatred and incitement to kill, specifically
targeting moderate Hutus and Tutsi leaders by name. Meanwhile militias were recruited
openly in the streets and sent in groups of hundreds to military camps for weapons
training and indoctrination, and were organized for the genocide. These preparations
were supplemented with the distribution of guns to government supporters and with
ethnic mobilization. The preparations for genocide and the already ongoing ethnic
violence were observed by the diplomatic corps, human rights and other NGOs, UN
agencies, and religious organizations.
Illuminated by early warning indicators, the Yugoslav wars and genocides tell a
similar tale: non-democratic state, ethnic power relations threatened by constitutional
changes and secessions, prior history of genocide, powerful outside states supporting
different groups, massive hate and fear propaganda in the media, ethnic rebellions that
challenge the authorities, paramilitary militias for genocide sponsored by governments
and the army. As for genocide itself, there were ample trial runs on a smaller scale: the
siege and shelling of Dubrovnike; the leveling of Vukovar and the massacre of the male
survivors after it fell. 1 02 The Bosnian war started with a massacre and war crimes at
Zvornik, witnessed by a high UN official who happened to be driving through. 1 03
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Eventually UN peacekeepers were deployed; they spent much effort on recording
violations of cease fires, trying to figure out who was responsible for an unending stream
of war crimes and atrocities, and how to prevent humanitarian relief workers, equipment,
and shipments from falling into the hands of combatants. UN peacekeeping was unable
to lift the siege of Sarajevo and stop ethnic cleansing and war crimes. After the creation
of UN protected zones, Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica were forced to surrender to
civilians under their protection to General Mladic's executioners, knowing full well the
outcome.
In contrast to these international peacekeeping disasters, some observers believe
that the deployment of an international military force at the very start of these countries
showing genocidal signs would have deterred the genocide. General Dallaire estimated
5,000 soldiers in Rwanda would have prevented the genocide while about 10,000 was
estimated by Radovan Karadzic for Bosnia-Serbia. 104
I believe the task of genocide prevention is a humanitarian imperative at the end
of a century marked by the most disturbing negative dialectics of modernity and
barbarism. On the fifty years anniversary of the Anti-Genocide Convention in December
1 998, the UN was called upon to amend the Convention comprehensively. Genocide
prevention has to be standardized internationally. Mass murder as a possible option for
failed states to deal with minorities has to stop once and for all.
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